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Whether the interests of a nation are best served by main-
taining fixed exchange rates or by allowing exchange rates to
vary continues to be a much debated issue among economists. Most
of the earlier literature on this topic focused attention on the
two extremes of completely fixed exchange rates versus the perfectly
flexible or free floating system,examining the^circumstances (degree
of factor mobility, structure and origin of disturbances, etc.)
under which one or the other would be preferred. More recently,
several authors have adopted a different perspective by which the
fixed and free float regimes are considered endpoints on a continu-
ous spectrum of exchange rate flexibility (e.g. Boyer (1978),
Frenkel and Aizenman (1982), Roper and Turnovsky (1980)). Undoubt-
edly, this view was stimulated by the move toward a system of
managed floating among the major world currencies since 19 73, where
governments intervene in foreign exchange markets to varying extents,
but not enough to peg the exchange rate. The apparent payoff from
this change in perspective is that it allows addressing the ques-
tion: Under a given set of circumstances, what is the optimal level
of exchange rate intervention, or the optimally managed float?
Clearly, the ability to answer this question should lead to improved
policy reconunendations since, instead of having to choose between
two, generally suboptimal exchange rate regimes, we have here the
possibility of tailoring an exchange rate regime to a particular set
of national circumstances.- 2 -
The objective in this paper is to address the issue of an
optimally managed float in the context of. a rational expectations
macromodel of an open economy. As Buiter (1979) already recognized
in a similar endeavor, the search for an optimal foreign exchange
market intervention strategy raises the same issues which had
already been subjected to heated debates, in earlier Keynesian-mone-
tarist confrontations; these being the issue of "rules versus dis-
cretion" and the controversy over "targets, instruments and indi-
cators" of policy. With respect to the first of these,Sargent and
Wallace (1976) state that "there is no longer any serious debate
about whether monetary policy should be conducted according to
rules or discretion," but that "the central practical issue... is
the appropriate form of the monetary policy rule".By casting the
problem of optimal exchange rate management in the language of
rational expectations equilibrium models, it becomes transparent
that this issue also consists in essence of finding the appropriate
feedback rule. Also, this treatment makes more transparent the
distinction between a "managed float" and an "adjustable peg"
system; something which earlier disequilibrium treatments; such as
Frenkel and Aizenman's (1982) discussion of "the optimal degree of
fixity of exchange rates", left unclear. Here it becomes simply a
question of which target variable is to be controlled by an optimal
rule-
To obtain an optimal intervention strategy, the analysis will
focus on the behaviour of real variables under different policy- 3 -
rules. This confronts us with the well-known policy-ineffectiveness
results which are common to a large class of equilibrium macro-
models that display money neutrality; see McCallum (1980) . The
central message from these results is that for government demand
management policies to be systematically effective in influencing
real behavior, public policymakers must either be in possession of
superior information or be in a better position to respond and
adjust to new information than private agents, say because there
are economies of scale or public goods involved. This paper does
not strive to contribute to this policy-ineffectiveness debate.
Instead, it grants the premise that the government policymakers are
in an advantageous position vis-a-vis private decisionmakers with
regard to the'acquisition of information and the speed of response.
This assumption is slightly relaxed in a second version of the
model where, even though public and private decisionmakers have the
same access to information, contractual rigidities provide a hin-
drance to the speed with which private, but not public, agents can
respond to current information.
In the next section, a basic macromodel for a small open eco-
nomy is presented. Thereafter, the analysis is structured in three
parts: First is presented the hypothetical case, to be used as a
benchmark, where policymakers have perfect contemporaneous informa-
tion on all economic shocks so that an intervention rule can be
constructed on the basis of these shocks. Secondly, the analysis
is repeated for the case where policymakers only receive current- 4 -
information on a restricted set of variables. In this case the
optimal intervention rule amounts to an indexation rule by which
variations in either the exchange rate or the money supply are tied
to variations in the other observed variables.In the last part,several
foreign exchange market intervention schemes which have been vari-
ously proposed in the past will be reinterpreted in the terms of
the present model, and then compared to the optimal rule derived
in the preceding section. A short summary concludes the paper.
Two papers, already mentioned, which are closely related to
the present paper in both the issues addressed and the approach
used are those by Buiter (1979) and Roper and Turnovsky (1980).
Buiter uses a more general objective function by which an optimal
intervention rule is defined than is done here. However, in his
framework, government policymakers respond only to past realizations
of market data, whereas here the market period is so defined that
policymakers are assumed able to respond to current data. Favoring
this construction is the fact that data from international finan-
cial markets, where the intervention takes place, is available after
very short intervals. Roper and Turnovsky (1980) also emphasize
this point. The present analysis can in turn be differentiated from
theirs in that it is conducted in a less restrictive macroeconomic
framework allowing for flexible quantities and prices. This has
the advantage of not only allowing for greater flexibility in model-
ling the process of exchange rate determination, but also of expand-
ing the range of issues which can be addressed.- 5 -
I. An Open-Economy Macromodel
The model of macroeconomic activity used to analyze the effects
of alternative policy measures is taken from Weber (1981). It repre-
sents a fairly straightforward extension to an open economy of a
set of models typically used in the macro-rational expectations
literature and popularized, for example, by Barro (1976) and Sargent
and Wallace (1975). The model consists of the following linear sys-
tem of equations:




















(4) i = i* + E(e. .. - e,/fi._1) (interest parity condition)
All variables are expressed in logarithms and have the following
definitions: y. is the current level of real output or income, P..
is the domestic goods price level, e. is the exchange rate (units
of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency), M. is the domes-
tic nominal money supply, i is one plus the domestic nominal inter-
est rate and i* is the corresponding world interest rate. P* is- 6 -
the foreign currency price of foreign goods and will be assumed to
obey the following stochastic process:
(5) P* = P*_1 + k +
where k is the (average) foreign inflation rate. The terms u, , v, ,
n. and e. are mutually independent white noise disturbances. The
expression E(x./ft, ..) is used to denote the mathematical expectation
of the value of x in period t conditioned on the information set,
Q. -i / which contains all variables dated (t-1) and earlier. Later
on the model will also be altered to include expectations based on
current information. The letters a., b., c, symbolizing the para-
meters of the model, are all taken to be non-negative.
Since this model has already been described in some detail
by Weber (1981), this need not be repeated here. Instead, only
some of the more prominent features which make the model attractive
for the purposes of this study will be commented on. First, embodied
in the supply equation (1) is the natural rate hypothesis, stating
that only the unanticipated component of changes in the price level
(or inflation) will have an effect on output. The legged output
term in equation (1) is included to account for the empirical obser-
vation that output movements over time are serially correlated. This
could be theoretically justified as a proxy for capacity effects
or wealth effects. Equations (2) and (3) are standard IS and LM
equations. In equation (4) is reflected the joint assumption that
domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes, capital is
perfectly mobile, and that the domestic country is too small to- 7 -
affect the world nominal interest rate. Domestic and foreign goods,
on the other hand, are not assumed to be perfect substitutes as
evidenced by the fact that no restrictions have been placed on the
behavior of the terms of trade, e. + P* - P. . All markets are
assumed to clear in every period. Finally, if for simplicity all
constants in the model are set to zero, including all foreign varia-
bles, then it is easy to derive that in the absence of shocks in
steady-state equilibrium y = i = 0 and e = P = M. This serves to
illustrate that the system is homogeneous of degree 1 in all nomi-
nal variables.
Throughout most of the main text it is assumed that private
agents receive macroeconomic information with a one period time lag,
or else that their reaction time to new information takes that long.
This is made explicit in equations (1)-(4) by the fact that all
expectations are conditioned on set ^t_-i • In contrast, government
policymakers are assumed to have immediate access to some current
information and able to react instantaneously (in terms of adjust-
ing their policy variables) within one period to new information.
Weber (1981) motivates the sluggish reaction time on the part of
private agents, in the specific case of equation (1), by pointing
to the existence of contracts which remain in force longer than one
period, so that current employment decisions will partly depend on
past expectations based on old information. This argument leans
on previous work by Fischer (1977) and Gray (1976). The same argu-
ment is more difficult to defend in the case of the remaining equa-
tions of the model. It appears particularly unrealistic for some- 8 -
financial variables and prices, such as exchange rates, which are
quoted on a daily basis. In order to meet this criticism, the ana-
lysis will also be repeated for the case where the expectations in
equations (2)-(4) are based on the same updated information set,
Q , available to government policymakers. However, because this
does not alter the qualitative results derived from the lagged-
information model, the results from the updated-information model
are relegated to the footnotes.
The solution technique applied in this analysis is the method
of undetermined coefficients which can now be described. First, the
model can be simplified by substituting for i and P*? using (4)
and (5) into (1) and (2). This yields
(6) (a1+-b2)Pt + (b.,- a^)E(Pt/at_^) - b.,E
= b2et - b1E(et+l- et/nt_1)
Similarly, equation (3) can be rewritten as
(7) Mt = (c0+ ciai)Pt - c^ElPt/Qt_^) + c3et - c2E(et+1
+ c1a1yt_1 - c2i* + Ciut + C3P;_1 + c3et
This leaves us with two equations in the three variables P ,
e, and M,. The remaining equation needed to determine the system
is given by the as yet unspecified government policy rule. The spe-
cification of that rule is the subject of subsequent sections. Mean-- 9 -
while, provided we restrict ourselves to linear feedback rules, it
is possible to express the general solution of the endogenous vari-
ables as linear functions of the exogenous and predetermined vari-
ables in the model. Unless the government policy rule responds to
additional variables not included in (6) and (7), this solution can
be written as




where the n's, X's and <F's are coefficients to be determined.
Under the assumption that private agents perceive new information
2
with a lag, their expectations can be expressed as
(11)
= (nQ + n5k)
(12) E(et+^/Qt_^) = (XQ
The solution technique now involves substituting equations (9)-(12)
for the appropriate terms in equations (6)-(7) and the policy rule
equation. For an equilibrium solution, it is necessary that each
equation hold identically in each of the predetermined and exogenous
variables. This should yield enough restrictions to solve for all
of the coefficients in (8)-(10).- 10 -
For purposes of illustration, let us focus momentarily on the
exogenous shock, u . Because equations (6) and (7) must hold for
all values of u , the coefficients involving this term obey the
following restrictions: (i) (a^ + b2)n2 - k>2A2 + 1=0, and (ii)








provided by the policy rule, it would be possible to solve for
(11-, Xy, V~) in terms of the structural parameters of the model.
Finally, it is necessary to describe the manner by which alter-
native intervention rules are assessed. Despite some reservations,
only the simplest criterion, namely unconditional output-variance
minimization, will be applied here. From equation (1) and using
equation (8), the prospective solution for P , output can be written
(13) yt = ai(Pt - E(Pt/at_1)) + a^^ + ufc
= ai(n2ut + n3vt + n4nt + n^) + a2yt_1 + ufc ,
and its unconditional variance is therefore
(14) a
2 = (1 - a
2)"
1 ((1 + ain2)





where cross-correlations between different shocks are ignored. This
is to be minimized by choice of an appropriate policy rule.
Alternative suggestions for a policy objective have included
the minimizing of variations in real consumption expenditures, as— 11 —
dictated by microeconomic considerations. That proposal becomes
impractical in this model since consumption has not been explicitly
defined. Others have suggested the maximization of an intertemporal
aggregate welfare function; Buiter (1980). Insofar as the argument
in the utility function is restricted to output, it would turn out
that this criterion would also on general reduce to some sort of
output-variability minimization. The inclusion of other variables
in the utility function, on the other hand, has to be motivated more
carefully. It is not clear, for example, whether nominal variables,
such as the price level or inflation rates, should enter the utility
function as arguments in their own right or simply as proxies to
reflect the misallocations in the real sector that may occur on
account of excessive variability of these terms. Lastly, an argument
can be made that the optimal economic behavior is that which would
occur if all agents made their decisions under perfect contemporane-
ous information - the perfect markets solution. Therefore, the
objective of government policy should be to minimize the deviations
of actual output from this benchmark behavior. This argument ignores
the possible existence of public goods and other externalities. For
present purposes, however, it is enough to note that this
criterion would also lead to the same recommendations in this model
as the output-variance minimizing criterion, with the one exception
of adjustments to the real supply shock, u,.- 12 -
II. Optimal Stabilization Policy with Complete Current Information
Consider the hypothetical case where the central authorities
can observe and react to all current realizations of the random
shocks. This would in principle allow the formulation of a policy
feedback rule directly as a function of these shocks. The problem
which has not yet been addressed concerns the target variable that
is to be controlled by the feedback rule. The two alternative candi-
dates which are most often proposed in the literature are the
exchange rate and the money supply. Even though any other currently
observed variable, such as P in this model, could potentially
serve as a candidate, the focus here will remain on those
two alternatives. The issue of whether it is operationally easier
to target prices or quantities will also be side-stepped here by
assuming that both could be equally well controlled by the authori-
ties. It can then be shown that it is irrelevant whether the
exchange rate or the .money supply are targeted optimally.
Begin with an exchange rate rule. In this case equation (9)
might be proposed as a possible feedback rule, where the A's are
parameters to be set by the government. This would mean that only
equations (6) and (7) are needed to solve for the remaining unde-
termined coefficients, the n's and f's, as functions of the struc-
tural parameters and the policy parameters. Applying the method
outlined in the previous section, the following values are obtained




n1 = A.,- a2/(b2+-.-b1 (1-a2)) *1 = (1+c
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where A = (b2 + a1 (c^ c3))/(a1+ b2) and B = (co+ c^a^)/(a^+ b2) .
The optimal exchange rate rule can now be derived by substitut-
ing the expressions for the n's in (15) into the objective function
(14), and minimizing it with respect to the control parameters, the
,\ ' s. Notice that an absolute minimum is achieved when H- = -a.,
and n., = u. = n, = 0. In this case all output variance is eliminated.
The appropriate policy setting to bring this about would be (from
-1 -1 (15)) A2=a1 , A3= -b2 , A4 = 0 and A, = -1. In words, the exchange
rate should be devalued in response to a-'.positive supply shock,
revalued in response to a positive aggregate demand shock and to
a positive shock to the foreign price level, but should not respond
4
to random changes in money demand.
Suppose that instead of an exchange rate rule, the central
authorities contemplate a money supply rule. This would mean that
the f's in equation (10) would be considered policy parameters, while
the A's and n's become endogenously determined. It is obvious, how-
ever, that the variance of output will be minimized as before with- 14 -
-1
n~ = -a.. and n_ = n^ = n, = 0. Introducing this restriction into
the linear system of equations (15) would therefore yield the same
optimal solution for the relevant A's and f's as with an exchange
rate rule. An interesting aspect of this result is that if the mone-
tary authorities were optimally targeting the exchange rate, the
resulting behavior of the money supply should be the same as if
they had been optimally targeting the money supply in the first
place. It bears repeating, however, that this applies only to the
extent that prices and quantities are equally controllable.
One observation which will be useful for later reference con-
cerns the elements which have been included in the policy feedback
rule. In principle, any number of lagged variables could have been
added to the policy feedback rules, which would imply that all the
proposed solutions, equations (8)-(10), would contain terms involv-
ing these lagged variables. However,as the preceding solution has
shown, and as can be observed directly from equation (1), the
behavior of real output remains unaffected by policy responses to
lagged variables, even though this would clearly have an impact on
the behavior of nominal variables• To the extent that only real
variables are of concern to us, more elaborate dynamic feedback
rules involving past variables can therefore be ignored.
III. Optimal Stabilizaticn Policy with Restricted Current Information
In practice, "shocks" are rarely observed directly, only their
effects, namely price changes or quantity changes. In fact, it is
not at all clear whether shocks can even be meaningfully defined- 15 -
independently of their effects.At any rate,the policymakers are now
assumed to receive current information on a limited set of vari-b
ables. In the case of our model, let this set. consist of P. , e , M, ,
P*. The task facing the policymakers is then to find an optimal
policy rule by which either e. or M, .are indexed to the remaining
observable variables. Since the values of the current untargeted
variables depend on current realizations of the underlying shocks,
this is simply an indirect means of responding to the shocks. In
the fortuitous case where there are at least as many linearly inde-
pendent observable variables as there are shocks in the system, it
would be possible to extrapolate the exact values of all the current
shocks and this would place us in the situation dealt with in the
preceding section. This does not apply, however, for this particu-
lar model.
Let us then consider the following exchange rate rule:
(16)' et =
where the g.'s are parameters to be chosen by the policymakers. In
principle, the exchange rate rule could be expanded to include also
lagged values of the variables. However, as was argued before, this
would not have an impact on the behavior of y . Equation (16) along
with (6) and (7) can now be used to solve for the undetermined coef-
ficients in (8)-(10) as functions of the structural parameters and
the g.'s. Since from expression (14) the variance of y, only depends
on the values of the n's, attention is focused on these coefficients,
Their solution values turn out to be:- 16 -
(17) nQ = gQ
- go- gid+ co(1- a0))) aJg-c. + g, (c,+c, (1-a0) ) -1)
-1
(1- a2)
n2 = ((b2c1 + c3)g1 - DA








n5 = (1 + g3)(1- g.,- g2)"
1
n6 = b2d + g3)A"
1
where A = a^ + b2 (1- g2) - g1 (b2+ a^ (c3+ Cjb^ ) .
By inserting these values of the n's into the expression for the
variance of output, we could then minimize (14) with respect to the
control parameters g., g2 and g3. From (17), we can observe directly,
however, that there does not exist a policy setting which will eli-
minate all "variation in y , as in the preceding full information
example. The only unambiguous recommendation which can be made is
Q
to set g., = -1 . This will equate nfi to 0. In words, the exchange
rate should be appreciated in the same proportion as the foreign
price level. This will insulate the terms of trade from foreign
price shocks and thus eliminate this source of variability from the
domestic economy. With regard to the other two policy parameters,
g. and g», all that can be said is that their optimal (i.e., output-
variance minimizing) values will depend on the relative sizes of
the disturbances and on the sizes of the structural parameters.
As an illustration, if the demand for money provides the primary
source of variability, then by setting g1 = 0, this leads to n, = 0,- 17 -
so that this shock is no longer transmitted to the price level and
hence to output. With this policy setting, variations in .money
demand are entirely absorbed by variations in the money supply.
Alternatively, if aggregate demand were to become the primary source
of variability, this could be eliminated by setting g1 = c, . How-
ever, there do not exist values for g.. and g2 that will simultane-
ously set ru = n. = 0 and n2 = - a. .
Now consider the case of an optimal money supply rule. Since
the set of currently observable variables remains the same, the
exchange rate rule (16) can be rewritten as
(18) Mj. = -(go/g-,) + (Vg1)et - (g2/gi)Pt - (g3/gi)pj ,
and thereby converted into a money supply rule. It could be easily
shown then that the optimal values of the monetary rule parameters
are the same as would be obtained by substituting into (18) the
optimal values for the exchange rate rule parameters. This result
mirrors the conclusion of the preceding section, namely that, apart
from the controllability issue mentioned earlier, the optimal mone-
tary rule and the optimal exchange rate rule both lead to the same
macroeconomic behavior.
An interesting possibility which has been raised by Roper and
Turnovsky (1980) and which also appears here is that it is conceiv-
able that the optimal intervention policy is one of "leaning with- 18 -
the wind" rather than against. "Leaning against the wind" is
generally understood as a policy of contracting the money supply
(selling foreign reserves) in response to a depreciating exchange
rate to offset further depreciation, and vice-versa. This would
imply a negative value for the term (1/g.,) in equation (18). But
now consider again the previous example where only aggregate demand
shocks matter. It was found for that case that the optimal setting
for g. would be c~ . The optimal monetary rule would then turn out
to be M = c,e, , where 0 <_c-.<_1 . It could similarly be shown that
a positive response is also optimal in the case where only aggre-
gate supply shocks matter. This result has certain potentially dis-
turbing implications. From the coefficient solutions in (17) observe
that for certain values of g- and g~ the term A vanishes, which
means that the price level would exhibit explosive behavior. This
problem can arise when either g1 or g~ assume positive values. Given
that in practice it is unlikely that policymakers can set interven-
tion parameters with the precision implied in theory, attempts to
implement the optimal stabilization policy may instead lead to a
magnification of economic fluctuations. This danger may be illus-
trated by considering once more the variance of output when only
aggregate demand disturbances matter. This becomes
2 2 2 2 2 a = (a.a /(1 - a2))IU. Assuming for simplicity that g~ = 0, 0I3 can
be represented as a function of g.. as illustrated in Figure 1 . A
fixed exchange rate rule occurs when g1 =0. Notice then that as
g1 is increased toward its optimal setting, c, , the absolute value- 19 -
Figure 1- 20 -
2
of n3, and therefore a , will first increase before declining
again. Moving closer to the optimal setting is therefore no guaran-
tee for better performance.
IV. A Comparison of Several Intervention Proposals
This section examines a small sample of intervention rules
which have been proposed in the literature in the context of the
equilibrium model developed before. Following the distinction made
earlier, the discussion focuses first on some exchange rate rules
before considering a monetary rule.
Although the Bretton Woods system did allow parity changes in
the event of "fundamental disequilibria", the definition of such
a state was never spelled out explicitly. Williamson (1965) was one
of the first to suggest a systematic rule to govern exchange
rate changes which became known as the crawling peg. Since then
there have appeared numerous additional proposals, many of which
are conveniently described in Williamson (1981). A useful distinc-
tion here is between what McKinnon (1981) terms "active" and
"passive" exchange rate rules. In the language of optimal control
this would be referred to as open loop versus closed loop solutions
or, more casually, rules without and rules with feedback.- 21 -
Active Rules - Under an active rule, the government proposes
to effect certain exchange rate changes in the foreseeable
future which are not contingent on future economic developments,
e.g. such as depreciating the exchange rate by 2 percent every
month. We could express this rule as: e = e,_1 + .02. But more
elaborate formulas could also be devised such as
n





extent the behavior of real output is a function of the government
parameters, g^. Recall from the previous analysis that the only
channel by which policymakers can systematically influence real
output is by reacting to new information not yet available to
private agents or not available at the time that contracts had
been formed. The active feedback rule described here, however,
does not involve any information which is not known to private
agents, and hence the policy-ineffectiveness result, that changes
in the gi's will leave real output unchanged, applies. The same
can be said also for active monetary rules of the form:
n
M = k + £ g-,M. .-
i=0 '
 r '
On the other hand, the model may not be sufficiently rich to
accommodate the primary argument for which active rules had been
proposed. McKinnon (1981) regards active exchange rate rules as
an indirect way of targeting the inflation rate. It is suggested
that a preannounced pattern of devaluations would help coalesce
price expectations around a particular rate of inflation and thus
lead to greater market efficiency. One way to introduce this aijgu-- 22 -
ment into the earlier model might be to assume that private agents'
expectations contain also an unsystematic term, such as E(e,+1/fi.)+£. ,
where £ is an independent source of variability whose variance
depends on the costs of forming accurate expectations. If the
government announces (credibly) what e.+1 will be, rather than let-
ting it be market-determined, this reduces private prediction costs
2
and thus a . If this is the only argument, however, there does not
appear any advantage to choosing one predetermined path of devalua-
tion, including a fixed rate, over another, unless the behavior of
g
nominal variables constitute independent policy objectives.
Passive Rules - Williamson (1981) suggests that in most countries,
where some form of "crawling peg" was implemented, the practical
motivation was essentially to neutralize inflation differentials
between such countries and their trading partners or competitors.
This could be modelled by considering a rule which keeps the Terms
10
of Trade constant,
(19) et = c + Pt - Pj
This can be seen as a special case of the exchange rate equation
(16), where g_ = -g3 = 1 and g1 = 0. Feeding these values into the
expressions for the price coefficients in (17) yields the second
row of values in Table 1. It is obvious that this rule could never
be superior to the optimal rule developed in Section III. However,- 23 -
it may be of interest to observe that this rule completely insu-
lates real output from supply shocks and from foreign price level
shocks. In that respect a PPP rule is an improvement over a con-
stant exchange rate rule or a constant money rule. The other side
of the coin, however, is that the economy would show a highly
unstable response to all other shocks. This was also recognized
by McKinnon (1981) and can be seen in Table 1 by the explosive
values of n1. The reason is easy to explain: Notice that
the aggregate demand equation (2) can be written as
yt = bQ + biE(P*+1 - Pj/n^) + b2(et + P£ - Pt)
= bQ + b.,k + b2(et + Pj - Pt)
after substituting (4) and (5). Consider now the effect of a once-
for-all positive aggregate demand shock. Since the monetary autho-
rities are keeping the terms of trade fixed, aggregate demand
increases by the full amount of the shock. This requires an equal
increase in aggregate supply (brought about by an unexpected price
increase) to clear the goods market. In the next period, aggregate
supply would be higher than before, on account of the persistence
term, and in the absence of any further shocks to the system.
Normally, this should lead to a fall in the terms of trade (as
prices fall) in order to redirect demand toward domestic goods.
However, the PPP rule by the monetary authorities prevents the
terms of trade from serving their market clearing role. Instead
every incipient fall in prices is countered by a revaluation with- 24 -
the consequence that further price falls are required.
A variant of the PPP rule is the suggestion by the German
Council of Economic Experts in the mid 60"s that the rate of
depreciation be equated to the difference between a target national
inflation rate and the actual foreign inflation rate. This rule
can be written as e - e._1 = T - (P* - Pf_1) or
(20) et = et_1 + T - k -
where T is a (constant) target inflation rate, k is the systematic
component of the foreign inflation rate and e is the unsystematic
component. This rule would be another special case of the optimal
rule in Section III, equation (16) where g3 = -1 and g1 = g = 0.
The values of the n's under this rule are given in the third row
of Table 1. For the greater part, this rule yields the same operat-
ing characteristics in this model as a constant exchange rate
system, except that it insulates the real sector from unsystematic
foreign price shocks.
It may be interesting to observe further that the primary
concern of the German Council of Experts at the time this rule was
proposed was with maintaining price stability in the face of infla-
tionary pressures originating abroad rather than with reducing out-
put fluctuations. By that criterion, however, note from the values
of the reduced form coefficients in table 1 (rows 3 and 4) that a
free float would have been preferrable to the crawling peg. That is- 25 -
because the crawling peg rule (20) simply postpones the impact of
foreign price changes on domestic prices (from the fact that IL= 0,
o
but n7 = 1), whereas the free float insulates the domestic price
level from foreign price changes altogether (since n = J[- = 0) .
6 7
Another suggested formula for parity changes, attributed to
James Meade and Thomas Willettby Williamson (1981), includes tying
the rate of exchange depreciation to the rate at which foreign
reserves are being lost or gained. If for simplicity it is assumed
that the high-powered money multiplier remains constant, this pro-
posal amounts to an indexation of exchange rate changes to money
supply changes
or
(21) et = aMt
In terms of the optimal rule in Section III this reduces to the
proposal of setting g1 = a, to be chosen optimally, and g~ = g., = 0.
As we found earlier, however, this rule could be improved on at
least by setting g-, = -1 and thereby eliminating the destabilizing
effects of foreign price disturbances; that is, under the assump-
tion that the information flow on P* is rapid enough to be observ-
able on a current basis.
Frenkel and Aizenman (1982) define an intervention index in the
context of a disequilibrium monetary model as the ratio of ac-
tual exchange rate changes over the equilibrium exchange rate- 26 -
change in the absence of exchange rate targeting by the monetary
authorities. They propose setting this index at an optimal level.
However, it is not clear whether this should be considered an
exchange rate rule or a monetary rule, or whether it is simply an
ex post measure of the relative variability of the exchange rate
and the money supply, written as y = (e - e..,)/(M - M •
This rule could be interpreted either as an exchange rate rule
et = et_.j + y (Mt - M .) . or as a monetary rule
Mt = Mt-1 + (1/Y) (et - et_.j). As was argued in Section III, it
should not matter as far as the optimal choice of y is concerned
which way the feedback rule is written, provided money and exchange
rates could be equally well targeted. That being the case then, this
proposal also reduces to the special case of the optimal rule in
Section III where g. = y and g2 = g^ = 0.
In 19 76, the OPTICA Report to the European Commission proposed
a monetary intervention rule requiring the monetary authorities
to buy foreign exchange whenever domestic inflation exceeds foreign
inflation lest the exchange rate depreciate by more than the dif-
ference in inflation rates.The original proposal did not consider
a symmetric response in the event of appreciations. However, De
Grauwe, Steinherr and Basevi (1980) consider an expanded version
of this rule which directs the monetary authorities to buy foreign
exchange (and thus expand the domestic money supply) whenever the
terms of trade worsen and to sell foreign exchange if they improve.
This rule may be expressed as- 27 -
(22) Mfc = Mt_1 - g(c + Pt - efc - pj) ,
where g is a policy parameter. Note that if g is set to zero,
(22) reduces to a constant money rule, while letting g approach
infinity reduces (22) to the constant PPP.rule examined earlier.
Rewriting (22) as
(22)' et = c + Pt - Pj+ (1) Mt~ ^
we observe that this rule can be viewed as a special case of the
optimal rule in Section III, where q, = <1/g) is chosen optimally
and g3 = -1, also the optimal setting, but where g~ is arbitrarily
restricted to be equal to 1. Furthermore, the reduced form solutions
for the endogenous variables (8)-(10) will also involve the term
M .., but that should have no bearing on the behavior of real out-
put.
One point to emerge from this brief review is that,in contrast
to the unrestricted optimal rule outlined in section 3, each of
these policy proposals involves extra restrictions placed on the
government policy parameters (g.. , g2, g3) . It therefore follows,
as a logical necessity, that none of the suggested rules could with-
in this framework lead to a superior economic performance than the
unrestricted optimal rule. At best it might be the case that the
configuration of disturbance term variances happens to be such that
the optimal policy setting happens to coincide with the proposed
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The stars signify that, of the four alternatives, the indicated intervention rule minimizes the influence of the relevant
disturbance on the behavior of real output.- 29 -
in a more general setting where more than output-variance enters
into the objective function. However, this criticism must be quali-
fied by recognizing the possibility that not all of these rules had
been proposed with the same assumptions in mind concerning the
availability of current information. For example, it is arguable
that Meade, Willett,and Frenkel and Aizenman, whose rule proposals
are captured by equation (21), did not consider price information
to be currently available. In that case it would be infeasible to
index exchange rates or reserves to current prices, and (21) turns
out to be the same as the optimal rule. This same extenuating argu-
ment is, on the other hand, not applicable to the remaining propo-
sals, such as the PPP rule, since they are implicitly premised on
the availability to policymakers of current price information.
While the preceding discussion has emphasized the limitations
of previous policy proposals from the.viewpoint of an unrestricted
optimal rule, this should not necessarily be construed as an enthu-
siastic endorsement of the optimal rule. Instead, it might be advis-
able to conclude on a less sanguine note by again pointing out a
possible danger in attempting to implement optimal policies. In
order that policy rules be successful in stabilizing economic fluc-
tuations it is necessary not only that government policymakers have
better information than private agents, as was assumed in this
paper, but also that this information be sufficiently accurate. In
the hypothetical case treated in section 2, where policymakers had
perfect current information, the possibility of destabilizing poli-- 30 -
cies did not arise. But in the analysis of section 3 involving
limited current information, it was shown that merely setting the
policy parameters in the neighborhood of their optimal values might
actually magnify rather than stabilize economic fluctuations.
It is not for lack of trying that reports on international
financial developments are often couched in such nebulous phrases
as "leaning against the wind" or "dirty floating". Another example
is provided by the former German Bundesbank president's statement
that the problem of defining "disorderly conditions" in the exchange
market "is similar to that of the definition of a pretty girl:
difficult to define, but one recognizes her when one meets her".
(Emminger (1982), p. 15). Though laudable for their honesty, state-
ments such as these do not inspire confidence in the precision with
which central banks operate or perhaps can operate. Upon recognizing
these limitations, it may well be that as a practical matter the
best course of action remains one of either a constant exchange rate
rule or a constant money rule, both of which involve relatively
undemanding operating procedures.
V. Summary
This paper examines the question of optimal foreign exchange
market intervention in the context of a common macro-model of an
open economy with rational expectations. It is assumed that govern-
ment policymakers receive better current information, or have a- 31 -
shorter reaction time to new information, than private agents. An
optimal intervention rule is derived, using the criterion of out-
put-variance minimization, for the case where policymakers have
perfect contemporaneous information and for the case where only
limited current information is available. This optimal rule was
then shown to perform at least as well, but generally better, than
a sample of other rules which had been variously proposed in the
literature. Less encouraging for proponents of activist intervention,
however, is the finding that the successful implementation of the
optimal rule may under some circumstances require more accurate
information that is generally available to central banks. When this
requirement is not met, attempts to implement the optimal rule may
instead destabilize the economy.- 32 -
Footnotes
If, as explained in the text, private agents also had current
information available when making all decisions except for the
supply decision, which remains a function of contracts formed
last period, then equations (6) and (7) would respectively
become:





With current information available, these expectations would be
expressed as:
(11)' E(Pt+1/ot) = nQ + n1E(yt/nt) + n5E(pJ/nt)






(12)' E(et+1/nt) = AQ + a1x1(n2ut •+
In the absence of contractual rigidities and with perfect contem-
poraneous information, the behavior of output would be given by
y. = a?y,_1 + u,. The squared deviations of actual output from
this level would be
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where A = a* + b.,(1 + o+ b.(1 - ao)))
The values of n , n. and n,. are the same as for the lagged infor-
mation case. Note that the optimal policy setting in this case
involves the same qualitative responses as with the lagged infor-
mation case treated in the text.
To consider exchange rates as variables that are observed on a
current basis would probably not meet with many objections, nor
would the inclusion of M. , as long as this is taken to refer to
high-powered money or foreign reserves. On the other hand, to
also include Pt and P* in this set is bound to raise considerably
more eyebrows, particularly when these are taken to be aggregate
price indices. Whether Pt and P* belong with the currently ob-
served variables is partly a matter of defining the length of
a market period in the model. Most important for the logical
consistency of this analysis, however, is that data on price
indices be available over shorter intervals than the data on
aggregate quantities such as y .
The reason for not also considering i in this set is that by
equation (5) the interest rate does not reflect any additional
information in this model that is not already contained in e ,
and therefore would not be useful in constructing a policy
response function.
The optimal exchange rate rule derived in the preceding section
could be written as e* = X* (u. , v, , r\., e, ) ' , where X* is a row
vector of optimal settings (Xt/ X*, X^, x£). Suppose there exist
four linearly independent variables, denoted by the column vector x, ,
which are functions of the four random variables. Then in reduced
form we can write, x = A(u. , v, , r\,, e. ) ' , where A is a 4 x 4
nonsingular matrix. The optimal feedback response function can
x, finally be written e. = X*A x
,.- 34 -
The solution values for the n's corresponding to the same exchange
rate rule but using the current information model, equations (6)'
and (7)' in footnote 1, are:




n6 = ((b2 + b^d + g3) + g1(b1c3 - b2c2))A~
1
where A = (1 - g^ (c2 + c3) (a1 + b2 + b.,(1 + aia2/(b2 + b1 (1 - ,a2);).) )
- (b2 + b^ (g2 + g1 (cQ + a1 (c1 - c^.,))) .
Only negligible differences distinguish the values of nn, n1
and n5 from those obtained in the lagged information model in
(17). But since the variance of y is not a function of these
terms, their values will not be reproduced here.
Q
This policy recommendation will not turn out quite that simple
in the current information case. However, from the values in
footnote ( 7) , the optimal setting for g., can be seen to be
-1-g1(b1c3 - b2c2)/(b2 + b.,).
There may also be other criteria, such as the operational ease
with which different rules can be implemented, by which certain
active rules would be preferred to others. But since the present
framework of analysis is not equipped to handle these, they are
not discussed further.
1
0 See also Genberg (1981).
1
1 This is discussed in both Williamson (1981, Ch. I) and in
Giersch (1973) .- 35 -
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